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1. Introduction 
 
Asset price bubbles are a threat to financial and macroeconomic stability. However, no 
consensus has been reached regarding how policymakers should deal with them. The role of 
monetary policy remains disputed. Two closely related questions arise in the policy debate. 
Does monetary policy contribute to fuel asset price bubbles and is it able to deflate bubbles? 
This debate has recently resurfaced with the implementation of unconventional monetary 
policy since 2008 and their potential adverse effects on financial stability.1 There are two broad 
opposite views in the literature on this issue. Borio and Lowe (2002), Cecchetti et al. (2003) and 
Woodford (2012) are in favour of a “leaning against the wind” approach which considers that 
expansionary monetary policy contributes to the emergence of asset price bubbles and 
restrictive policies can reduce them.2 An alternative view, the “modified Jackson Hole 
consensus”, would not recommend using monetary policy to deal with bubbles and financial 
stability issues and rely on macroprudential tools (see e.g. Gerlach, 2010, Svensson, 2012 and 
Collard et al., 2017).3 Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001) suggest that a “cleaning afterward” 
approach would be more optimal and Svensson (2016) demonstrates that the net benefit of the 
“leaning against the wind” strategy is negative as it entails a higher unemployment rate 
during both crisis and non-crisis periods. 
 
This policy debate echoes the lack of consensus in the theoretical literature on how to represent 
the formation and dynamics of bubbles.4 Within existing bubble models, the role of monetary 
policy is not clearly established: its effect on asset price bubbles depends on the nature of 
bubbles. First, in a rational bubble model à la Blanchard and Watson (1982), the asset price is 
decomposed into a fundamental value, equal to the sum of expected cash-flows, and a bubble 
component, which is a rational stochastic deviation from the fundamental value growing with 
the discount factor. Within this framework, Galí (2014) shows that bubbles are linked to 
monetary policy because the discount factor is related to the real interest rate. With nominal 
rigidities, central banks influence the real interest rate and higher rates would increase the size 
of the bubble. This effect would dominate the negative impact of a restrictive monetary policy 
on the fundamental value since rational bubbles have explosive conditional expectations (Diba 
and Grossman, 1988). Second, in models accounting for financial market imperfections, Allen 
and Gale (2000, 2004) suggest that expansionary monetary policy would feed bubbles through 
the credit dynamics. This transmission channel is also emphasized by Gruen et al. (2005) and 
Christiano et al. (2010) who suggest central banks to adopt a “leaning against the wind” 
approach by limiting sharp credit expansion. Allen, Barlevy and Gale (2017) modify Galí 
(2014)’s framework to include a crowding-out of resources and credit-driven bubbles and 
show that higher interest rates can dampen bubbles.5 The objective of this paper is to shed 
                                                     
1 Borio and Zabai (2016) and Juselius et al. (2016) fear that the benefits of unconventional monetary policies would 
decline with time while the risks to financial stability would increase. This view echoes the argument by Taylor 
(2009) that interest rates “too low for too long” in the United States (US) between 2001 and 2004 have triggered the 
housing market boom and subprime crisis. 
2 These authors also claim that price stability is not a sufficient condition to promote financial stability. Blot et al. 
(2015) find that there is no stable link between price and financial stability indicating neither that price stability 
promotes financial stability nor that price stability is correlated with financial instability. 
3 See Smets (2014) for a recent survey on the attitude of central banks towards financial stability. 
4 See Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013), Scherbina (2013) or Martin and Ventura (2017) for surveys. 
5 A third strand of models does not give much role to monetary policy as private agents’ behaviour is the key 
determinant of bubbles. They arise after some positive news, generally technology innovations, triggering a rise in 
the fundamental value, which is amplified either by coordination failures of rational arbitrageurs or by investors’ 
overconfidence. For instance, Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) and Ofek and Richardson (2003) develop models 
emphasizing informational frictions or heterogeneous beliefs. Kindleberger (2005) and Schiller (2015) document 
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light on this debate and to disentangle empirically the competing theoretical predictions about 
the effect of monetary policy on asset price bubbles. Contrary to the vast literature dealing 
with the impact of monetary policy on asset prices (see e.g. Rigobon and Sack, 2004 or 
Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005) or on asset price volatility (see e.g. Bernanke and Gertler, 1999), 
we focus specifically on the effect of monetary policy on the bubble component of asset prices. 
 
Not all asset price variations are bubbles, however the empirical identification of the 
fundamental value and the bubble component is challenging. Asset price bubbles arise in 
many theoretical frameworks, and empirical tests are ill-designed to identify bubbles as they 
fail to disentangle between bubbles and misspecifications of the underlying theoretical model 
(Gurkaynak, 2008). However, the term “bubble” remains extensively used in the literature to 
characterize periods when asset prices rise sharply and seem disconnected from 
fundamentals. In practice, the terms “deviations”, “price distortions”, “booms and busts”, 
“mispricing” or “over and undervaluations” could be used interchangeably. For simplicity, 
we use the term “bubble” to refer to these deviations. Whatever the term used, these deviations 
are a concern for many reasons. First, they may generate a misallocation of capital. Second, 
increases in asset prices driven by the bubble component may entail risk for financial stability 
jeopardizing the functioning of the financial system. Third, bubble bursts are associated with 
financial crises and with deeper and longer recessions.6 Fourth, the transmission of monetary 
policy may be impaired if the dynamic of bubbles goes against the response of fundamentals 
to monetary policy. Thus, it is crucial to disentangle asset price movements driven by 
fundamentals from movements resulting from the bubble component. 
 
Three empirical approaches - structural, econometric and statistical - may be considered to 
identify bubbles, but none of them has reached consensus. First, according to a structural 
model, the bubble is a deviation of the asset price from expected discounted cash flows. 
Second, the fitted value of an econometric specification accounting for a data-rich information 
set would provide an in-sample proxy for the fundamental value. Third, the literature has also 
relied on a statistical definition of the excessive level of asset prices, measured with a statistical 
filter (see e.g. Bordo and Wheelock, 2007, Goodhart and Hofmann, 2008, or Jordà et al., 2015). 
All these approaches present advantages and weaknesses to estimate the fundamental and 
non-fundamental components of asset prices. 
 
The main empirical challenge to investigate our research question is to provide a measure of 
the bubble component of a given asset. Our objective is not to assess which bubble model is 
best, nor to date the beginning of bubbles so as to detect them in real-time 7, but to estimate ex 
post historical deviations of asset prices from their fundamental value, from their best in-
sample fitted value, and from their trend. We develop a new bubble indicator using a Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) to extract the common denominator of structural, econometric 
and statistical approaches used in the literature. This provides us with an agnostic and 
conservative representation of bubbles. By construction, the first principal component boils 
down to a model averaging of the structural, econometric and statistical approaches and 
maximizes their common variance, whereas the idiosyncratic dynamics of each approach will 
be dropped. So the first principal component can be considered as a robust measure of the 
                                                     
those episodes in financial history when increases in asset prices have been observed after technological booms, 
which were believed to give rise to a “new era”. 
6 It must be noted that financial crises are not only triggered by asset price bubble bursts. Financial leverage and 
credit booms also matter for financial stability (see Adrian and Shin, 2008). This issue is left for further research. 
7 Phillips et al. (2011), Phillips and Yu (2011), Homm and Breitung (2012) and Phillips et al. (2015) propose recursive 
unit root tests to detect bubbles in real-time. These works focus on the explosive behaviour of bubbles so to measure 
their start in real-time, rather than the deviation of prices to their fundamental which is our object of interest. 
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bubble component. To that end, we first estimate fundamental or trend values and compute 
deviations of asset prices from these fundamental and trend values. We do so for stock and 
housing prices in the United States (US). Second, estimating a PCA of these deviations, we 
compute bubble indicators for each asset price. We acknowledge that looking at aggregate 
variables, both on the asset and geographical dimensions, might hide heterogeneous dynamics 
between subcomponents of the asset class (banking vs. intermediate goods sectoral indices, 
for instance) or between US  states (North Dakota vs. Florida, for instance).8 However, this 
aggregation bias would lead us to underestimate bubble episodes and so the potential effect 
of monetary policy on bubbles. Significant estimates would be all the more robust that they 
should be seen as a lower bound of this effect. 
 
The question of whether monetary policy may trigger asset price booms and busts has been 
extensively dealt with in the literature. Detken and Smets (2004), Ahrend et al. (2008) and Khan 
(2010) observe that stock and housing prices tend to increase excessively when short-term 
interest rates are below the level suggested by a Taylor rule. Taylor (2009) asserts that 
monetary policy in the early 2000s has fueled the housing boom in the US. This view has been 
challenged by Dokko et al. (2011) and Kuttner (2012) who suggest that the housing market 
dynamics would not have been strongly modified if interest rates had followed the Taylor 
rule. Del Negro and Otrok (2007) also conclude that monetary policy weakly contributed to 
the housing price dynamics in the US. Besides, Bordo and Wheelock (2007) provide evidence 
of a weak correlation between interest rates and excessive stock price increases. However, 
these papers do not rely on a structural identification of the bubble component of asset prices 
but focus on episodes of asset price dynamics that they consider as excessive. The closest 
papers to ours are Basile and Joyce (2001), Galí and Gambetti (2015) and Beckers and Bernoth 
(2016), but they only rely on the rational bubble model. The first assesses the contribution of 
monetary policy to the variance of bubbles. The second suggests that monetary policy 
tightening in the US may increase asset prices depending on the size of the bubble component. 
A policy rate hike reduces the fundamental value, but increases the bubble component since 
the bubble grows with the interest rate. For a small bubble component, the standard negative 
effect on the fundamental value dominates, whereas monetary policy tightening feeds the 
bubble and increases asset price when the bubble component is large. The third paper 
challenges the finding of Galí and Gambetti (2015) by including a time-varying expected 
equity risk premium as a key determinant of stock prices. 
 
The contribution of this paper is to assess the dynamic impact of monetary policy shocks on 
our bubble indicators. It departs from the existing literature in four ways. First, our definition 
of the bubble component does not rely exclusively on a single model but hinges on different 
representations of bubbles. Second, monetary shocks are identified by orthogonalising the 
policy instrument to the central bank information set as well as to private agents’ one and to 
macroeconomic and financial variables following the Romer and Romer (2004) approach. 
Third, we disentangle the effects of expansionary and restrictive shocks to consider the 
potential asymmetries of the impact of monetary policy.9 Fourth, we account for both standard 
and unconventional monetary policy by using shadow rates estimated by Wu and Xia (2016) 
and Krippner (2013, 2014) as an indicator of the overall monetary policy stance. We also 
disentangle the effects specific to the policy rate and central bank’s balance sheet policies in a 
second step. We are thus able to compare the response of the stock and housing bubble 
indicators to shocks to different instruments. We investigate the dynamic impact of monetary 
                                                     
8 See for instance Del Negro and Otrok (2007) who estimate the effect of monetary policy on the common component 
of housing prices in the US using a dynamic factor model.  
9 Gali and Gambetti (2015) use a time-varying VAR model, but do not differentiate the sign of monetary shocks. 
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policy over a 2-year horizon, to account for its potentially slow and delayed effects on a given 
asset price bubble, by estimating local projections à la Jordà (2005) and controlling for the other 
asset price bubble. In particular, we take advantage of the flexibility of local projections to 
analyse the potential asymmetric effects of restrictive and expansionary monetary shocks. 
 
A key message of this paper is that the effects of monetary policy are not symmetric and the 
responses to restrictive and expansionary shocks must be differentiated. The main result is 
that restrictive monetary policy cannot help deflating stock or housing price bubbles whereas 
expansionary policies do fuel stock market bubbles. This result is also confirmed on euro area 
(EA) data. Although this result does not support the predictions of rational bubble models (we 
find no evidence that higher rates increase bubbles), there is no evidence in favour of the 
“leaning against the wind” strategy as monetary policy is not a relevant instrument for central 
banks to deflate bubbles. However, the effect of expansionary monetary policy depends on the 
policy instrument. Whereas interest rates cuts – standard expansionary monetary policy – 
would inflate stock price bubbles, the risk that quantitative easing would inflate asset price 
bubbles does not materialize in the data. We even find that expansionary balance-sheet 
measures tend to lessen the bubble component of stock prices. From a policy perspective, 
central banks should be aware that there is a risk for expansionary interest rate policy to inflate 
stock price bubbles.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 addresses the identification of 
asset price bubbles and section 3 the empirical strategy. Section 4 presents the effects of 
monetary policy on asset price bubble components. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Identifying asset price bubbles 
 
Asset price bubbles are unobserved and there is no consensus on the most appropriate way to 
identify them empirically. This reflects theoretical controversies illustrated by Brunnermeier 
(2008): “Bubbles are typically associated with dramatic asset price increases followed by a collapse. 
Bubbles arise if the price exceeds the asset’s fundamental value”. Such a definition emphasizes two 
dimensions of asset price bubbles. Bubbles rely on the notion of a fundamental value and on 
excessive movements of prices without reference to the fundamental value. Thus, Fama (2014) 
defines bubbles as “an irrational strong price increase that implies a predictable strong decline”. We 
consider 3 specifications to identify bubbles. Under a “structural” approach, the bubble 
component is captured as the deviation from the fundamental value captured by the 
estimation of a discounted cash-flow model. Using a larger set of information to estimate the 
fitted value of the fundamental may provide a better proxy in-sample. This data-rich approach 
is called “econometric”. Finally, we resort to a “statistical” approach to identify excessive 
deviations from a statistical trend. None of these models has reached consensus, but our main 
assumption is that together they capture the main properties of asset price bubbles. 
 
2.1. A range of bubble models 
 
The asset price (𝑃𝑡) can be decomposed into a fundamental value (𝐹𝑡) and a bubble component 
(𝐵𝑡). None of these components is observable and must therefore be proxied. Under full 
information rational expectations and when agents are risk-neutral, the fundamental value is 
the sum of expected discounted future cash-flow payments:  
𝐹𝑡 = ∑ (
1
1+𝜌
)
𝑖
𝐸𝑡(𝐷𝑡+𝑖 ) 
∞
𝑖=1             (1) 
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For stock and housing markets, cash-flows (𝐷𝑡) are either dividends or rents, and the discount 
factor (𝜌) is the long term interest rate. When the transversality condition holds, equation (1) 
is the solution to the standard asset pricing equation and 𝑃𝑡 = 𝐹𝑡. Under rational expectations, 
a bubble solution exists (𝐵𝑡 > 0) such that equation (2) is:10 
𝐸𝑡(𝐵𝑡+1) = (1 + 𝜌)𝐵𝑡         (2) 
 
Assuming risk-neutral agents, a constant discount factor and constant cash-flows, equation (3) 
determines the fundamental value as follows: 
𝐹𝑡 = 𝐷/𝜌           (3) 
 
Equation (3) can then be used to identify the bubble component. We depart from the standard 
model by adding a time-varying proxy for the risk-premium, consistent with Beckers and 
Bernoth (2016), which would account for a time-varying risk aversion and the risk-taking 
channel of monetary policy. Henceforth, we first estimate equation (4) relating the asset price 
to the current cash-flow, the discount factor and the risk-premium with OLS:11 
𝑃𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1. 𝐷𝑡 + 𝛼2. 𝜌𝑡 + 𝛼3𝜙𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡
𝑂𝐿𝑆         (4) 
 
where Pt is the log of the real price of a given asset (stock or housing), Dt is the associated cash 
flow of this given asset (real dividend or rent), 𝜌𝑡 is the time-varying discount factor captured 
by long-term sovereign interest rates, and 𝜙𝑡 a proxy for the risk premium measured by the 
VIX index. 𝜖𝑡
𝑂𝐿𝑆 is the residual and stands for the deviation of the asset price from 
fundamentals – purged from the risk-premia.  
 
Under the “structural” approach, residuals stem from a model where the fundamental value 
is related to the cash-flows and the discount factor only. An alternative approach – 
“econometric” – rely on estimating empirical models where asset prices are represented by 
projections against a wide range of variables. By selecting a large set of macroeconomic and 
financial variables, equation (5) provides OLS estimates of the best in-sample prediction of a 
given asset price conditional to a given information set.  
𝑃𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽(𝐿). 𝑃𝑡 +  𝛽1. 𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽2. 𝐹𝑡 + 𝜈𝑡
𝑂𝐿𝑆           (5) 
 
Mt and Ft are vectors of macroeconomic (rents and dividends, industrial production, GDP, real 
disposable income, inflation, confidence indicators and oil prices) and financial variables (real 
long term interest rate, monetary and credit aggregates, other asset prices and the VIX 
indicator). Lags of the endogenous variable are also included in the estimation. For all 
explanatory variables, 3 lags are included in the specification.12 The residuals capture the 
component of the asset price unrelated to macroeconomic and financial fundamentals. 
 
So far, asset prices are defined as the sum of a fundamental component and some residuals. 
However, if residuals are normally distributed, they would only capture small and short-lived 
deviations from fundamentals. Such static bubbles would result from anomalies in financial 
markets. They are likely to be small (Filardo, 2004) and henceforth are irrelevant for monetary 
policy and macroeconomic stability. The statistical properties of residuals shed light on the 
nature of the deviations captured by equations (4) and (5). According to the Cumby-Huizinga 
test for autocorrelation and for the Portmanteau test for white noise (Table 1), normality and 
the absence of autocorrelation is clearly rejected for 𝜖𝑡
𝑂𝐿𝑆 but not for 𝜈𝑡
𝑂𝐿𝑆. Consequently, the 
residuals from equation (4) may capture persistent deviations from the fundamentals – a 
                                                     
10 Rational bubbles may also depend on fundamentals as illustrated by Froot and Obstfeld (1991). 
11 We discuss later alternative specifications of the cash-flow model. 
12 Specifications with leads have also been tested but do not change the result and the residual dynamics. 
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bubble – whereas the residuals from equation (5) would not. For 𝜈𝑡
𝑂𝐿𝑆, we consider a measure 
that takes into account the cumulative and dynamic process associated with a bubble 
formation. Each single deviation may be small and relatively irrelevant for policy makers but 
successive positive or negative deviations may signal a persistent deviation. A rolling-window 
sum of residuals captures dynamic and persistent deviations from fundamentals. We compute 
the rolling sum of residuals 𝜈𝑡
𝑂𝐿𝑆 over 36 months so as to capture at each point of the sample 
the cumulative deviation of a given asset price to its fundamental over a medium-term sample. 
 
In addition to the two models presented heretofore, we also consider a model corresponding 
to the “statistical” approach where bubbles are defined as significant deviations from a trend. 
Most of the papers in the literature have relied on a statistical filter to decompose asset prices 
between trend and cycle. Goodhart and Hofmann (2008) define boom periods as a persistent 
deviation from the trend of more than 5% and lasting at least 12 months while Detken and 
Smets (2004) use a 10% threshold. Alessi and Detken (2011) and Bordo and Jeanne (2002) define 
the boom as a 1.75 and 1.3 standard deviation at least from the trend respectively. For Bordo 
and Landon-Lane (2013), the boom occurs if a 5 % increase in house prices (10% for stock 
prices) is followed by a 25% correction within two years. In Jordà et al. (2013, 2015), a bubble 
is identified when an increase in a given asset price of more than 1 standard deviation from 
the trend is followed by a correction of 15% at least, over a 3-year period. Our third model, 
statistical, identifies bubbles with a dummy taking the value 1 (resp. -1) when asset prices are 
more than 1.5 standard deviation superior (resp. inferior) to the Christiano-Fitzgerald (CF) 
trend and the value 0 when asset prices are within these bounds, so 87% of the data lies within 
them.13 A synthetic description of all models is presented in Table 1. 
 
2.2. Data 
 
We estimate these three models for two asset prices: stocks and housing. Data are available 
from January 1986 to August 2016 (see Table A in appendix for data description and sources 
and Table B for descriptive statistics). The stock price index is the S&P500. We use Shiller’s 
benchmark monthly index for house prices. Each asset price is deflated by the CPI.  
 
For the cash-flow model, fundamental value is a function of cash-flows (dividends for stocks 
and rents for housing prices) and the discount factor. Dividends paid by corporations and 
rents received by households are provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Data are 
available at a quarterly frequency. 14 The long-term sovereign interest rates are used as the 
discount factor. The model is extended to account for a time-varying risk-premium, using the 
VIX indicator – the Chicago board of trade volatility index –, which is often used as a proxy 
for uncertainty and market appetite for risk. Yet, this model may not fully account from all 
available information. We also identify the fundamental component with a model estimated 
on a large set of information, including macroeconomic and financial indicators such as: real 
disposable income, inflation, real GDP, industrial production, oil prices, the Conference Board 
consumer and ISM firm confidence indicators, the VIX, 3-month interbank interest rate, 
monetary (M2) and credit aggregates (credits granted by commercial banks). Table 1 provides 
descriptive statistics and the correlation structure for each market. 
 
 
 
                                                     
13 The main advantage of the CF filter compared to the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter is that the former is one-sided 
so that the estimation does not affect the last point of the sample. 
14 Quarterly data have been linearly interpolated to monthly frequency. 
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2.3. A Principal Component Analysis of bubbles 
 
As emphasized earlier, there is no consensus on the appropriate method to identify bubbles. 
That is why we adopt an agnostic approach and consider that bubbles are captured by the 
common component of the three models described above. In order to summarize the 
information provided by the residuals 𝜖𝑡
𝑂𝐿𝑆, the rolling sum of residuals 𝜈𝑡
𝑂𝐿𝑆 and the 
“statistical” model, we perform a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to estimate a unique 
indicator maximizing the common variance of the individual bubble series. In addition to 
reduce information in one single series, another advantage of the PCA is to remove the 
evolution of each series that would be specific to that model and provides a robust measure of 
the bubble component of asset prices. More specifically, PCA seeks a linear combination such 
that the maximum variance is extracted from the variables. Components reflect both common 
and unique variance of the variables and may be seen as a variance-focused approach seeking 
to reproduce the total variable variance with all components and their correlations.15 
 
We compute bubble indicators for each market (stock and housing) by estimating the first 
component of the 3 individual bubble components of each market. Table 1 provides the main 
characteristics of the estimation of the stock and housing bubble indicators. These two bubble 
indicators capture 58 and 57% of the variance of their respective 3 bubble components. Besides, 
the highest loading factor is on the “structural” approach (model 1) for the stock bubble 
whereas it is on the “econometric” approach (model 2) for the housing bubble.  
 
The individual bubble components (for each approach) together with the bubble indicator (the 
first principal component) are plotted in Figure 1. The bubble indicator for stock prices 
coincides with the dummy of the statistical approach where bubbles (crashes) are identified 
as at least a 1.5 standard-deviation of prices above (below) their trend. The dotcom bubble is 
also clearly identified by the first principal component and the pure statistical approach. The 
bubble period would have started in 1999 and would have stopped in 2000. A bubble is also 
identified in 2007 followed by a crash in stock markets in late 2008. Turning to the housing 
market, the first principal component identifies a bubble in 2006 and the subsequent crash. 
This bubble indicator and the outcome of the statistical approach are clearly in line. Over the 
end of the sample, the bubble indicator is close to zero for both stock and housing markets. 
Table 1 also shows that the two bubble indicators are weakly correlated (0.13).  
 
2.4. Robustness 
 
The construction of the bubble indicator relies on assumptions related to the estimation 
methods for the “structural” and the “econometric” approaches, the rolling sum applied to 
residuals, the length of the rolling-window for the sum of residuals, the filtering method, and 
the smoothing parameters used for the “statistical” approach. We assess the robustness of the 
identification of these bubble indicators in section 4.5 by examining whether the impact of 
monetary shocks on asset price bubbles is affected by changes in the assumptions used to 
compute the bubble indicators.  
 
To that end, we compute several alternative PCA bubble indicators for which one dimension 
at a time is modified relative to the baseline assumptions. First, we apply the same 
transformation on residuals 𝜖𝑡
𝑂𝐿𝑆 and 𝜈𝑡
𝑂𝐿𝑆. We compute the rolling sum of residuals 𝜖𝑡
𝑂𝐿𝑆 over 
                                                     
15 In practice, computing PCA of a dataset X, an (m × n) matrix, where m is the number of variables and n is the 
number of observations, entails computing the eigenvectors and eigenvalues of the covariance matrix of X. The 
eigenvector with the highest eigenvalue, measuring the variance in all variables which is accounted for by that 
eigenvector, is the first component. 
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36 months and estimate the first principal component (PCA_rollingsum) with the rolling-sum 
of residuals for both “structural” and “econometric” approaches plus the “statistical” model. 
Inversely, the PCA may also be computed on standard residuals from equations (4) and (5) 
plus the “statistical” model (PCA_norollingsum). We also estimate PCA_roll24 and PCA_roll48 
bubble indicators where the rolling sum for residuals 𝜈𝑡
𝑂𝐿𝑆 of the “econometric” approach are 
computed over a 24-month and 48-month rolling-window. 
 
Equation (4) and (5) may also be estimated with an error-correction model (ECM) to capture 
the possibility that prices are a combination of a long-run trend and short-run dynamics. 
Breitung and Kruse (2015) argue that the dynamics of the asset price and its fundamental 
should be dealt with jointly and also use an ECM. Therefore, the price of the financial asset is 
allowed to deviate temporary from its long-term equilibrium and the bubble components for 
the “structural” and “econometric” approaches are captured by the rolling sum of residuals 
and used to compute a PCA_ECM bubble indicator.  
 
Besides, the estimation of the cash-flow model could be biased by endogeneity as the 
fundamental value is captured by cash-flows that might be driven by the asset prices. To 
account for this potential endogeneity issue, we estimate equation (4) with GMM, using 
industrial production and monthly interpolated GDP as instruments for cash flows, 
considering that current economic activity would provide information on current cash-flows. 
Moreover, another limitation of our analysis due to data availability is that we include 
contemporaneous cash-flows whereas the cash-flow model relies on the forward-looking 
nature of asset prices. This may introduce a bias in the measurement of bubbles. Consider the 
case where the central bank implements an expansionary monetary policy. Due to the 
transmission lags, the fundamentals do not immediately improve. However, rational investors 
anticipate an improvement of economic perspectives and henceforth a rise in future cash-
flows, so the asset price increases. If our model fails to account for this rise in expected cash-
flows, the increase in the asset price is mistakenly considered as a bubble. In order to account 
for expected cash-flows, we estimate equation (4) including the forward values of the 
respective cash-flows, 12 months and 36 months ahead. We estimate this model with GMM 
and use private and central bank output forecasts as instruments for future cash-flows. We 
acknowledge that the realized forward values are not expectations of these cash-flows. Yet, 
estimating equation (4) with forward values and GMM enables to assess, under some 
assumptions, the sensitivity of our baseline estimates to the forward-looking behaviour of 
investors. The corresponding PCA bubble indicators are named PCA_GMM, PCA_GMM12, 
and PCA_GMM36. 
 
Regarding the “statistical” approach, the baseline estimation resorts to a cyclical component 
estimated with the CF-filter. A HP-filter may also be used as an alternative to disentangle 
between the trend and the cyclical component of asset prices. Using this filtering method, we 
build the PCA_HP bubble indicator. Besides, the calibration of the CF-filter also matters as it 
may capture either short-term cycle or medium-term cycle. In the baseline, the procedure 
filters out stochastic cycles for periods smaller than 18 months and higher than 96 months (8 
years). Drehmann et al. (2012) characterize the length of cycles disentangling short-term and 
medium-term cycles for several indicators, including house and equity prices. They suggest 
that house and equity price medium-term cycles have a duration of 10 ½ years and 9 ½ years 
respectively. To account for a longer duration of cycles, we augment this range to 12 from 144 
months to perform the PCA (PCA_CF ≠smoothing). 
 
We also assess whether the estimation of the first principal components depends on the sample 
period considered. Therefore, we estimate the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of a PCA over 
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three subsamples (1986-1996, 1996-2006 and 2006-2016) and then predict the first principal 
component over the entire sample using the subsample estimates. We henceforth obtain three 
PCA bubble indicators (PCA_pre96, PCA_9606 and PCA_post06). Finally, we estimate the first 
principal component of all 14 models, including the ones used in the baseline and all 
alternative models described above (PCA _all). Finally, we also test whether our results are 
driven by the PCA estimation by assessing the impact of monetary shocks on each bubble 
component of the three approaches separately. 
 
3. The identification of monetary shocks 
 
Analysing the effects of monetary policy requires addressing issues about the identification of 
exogenous monetary shocks. Several methods have been used in the empirical literature and 
may lead to some discrepancies in the responses to monetary policy shocks.16 Our baseline 
choice is to resort to the Romer and Romer (2004)’s approach augmented following insights 
from the information friction literature. Concretely, the identification of shocks accounts for 
the information set of both policymakers and private agents. For robustness purposes, we also 
use alternative approaches based on high frequency event-study assumptions following 
Kuttner (2001) or based on the estimation of forward-looking Taylor rules where residuals are 
considered as the monetary innovation.  
 
3.1. Baseline monetary shocks 
 
The question of the most relevant identification strategy remains an open question. Empirical 
literature on monetary policy has often resorted to VAR models. However, timing 
assumptions in recursive identifications – reasonable for real variables and their sluggish 
reaction to shocks and low sampling frequency – are not relevant when applied to financial 
variables or fast-moving variables. There is indeed no rationale to suppose that some asset 
prices move faster than others. Romer and Romer (2004) regress the intended federal funds 
rate change on the information set of the monetary authority to purge endogenous responses 
to current and expected future economic developments.  
 
Because of different information sets (Romer and Romer, 2000, or Blinder et al., 2008), the 
Romer and Romer (2004)’s identification approach may underestimate the extent to which 
market participants are able to predict future interest rate decisions. As discussed in Blanchard 
et al. (2013) and Ricco (2015), the presence of information frictions significantly modifies the 
identification problem. We propose an identification that combines insights from Romer and 
Romer (2004) and from the information frictions literature. We thus require the estimated 
monetary shocks to be orthogonal to both central bank’s and private agents’ information sets 
and to macro and financial market information.17 In this context of imperfect information, the 
new information is only partially absorbed over time and, estimated surprises are likely to be 
a combination of both current and past structural shocks. 
                                                     
16 See Coibion (2012) for a discussion. 
17 The inclusion of both private and central bank forecasts in the regression model enables us to deal with three 
concerns. First, private agents and policymakers’ information sets include a large number of variables. Forecasts 
have the advantage of encompassing rich information sets. Bernanke et al. (2005) show that a data-rich environment 
approach modifies the identification of monetary shocks. Forecasts work as a FAVAR model as they summarise a 
large variety of macroeconomic variables as well as their expected evolutions. Second, forecasts are real-time data. 
Private agents and policymakers base their decisions on their information set in real-time, not on ex-post revised 
data. Orphanides (2001, 2003) show that Taylor rule-type reaction functions estimated on revised data produce 
different outcomes when using real-time data. Third, private agents and policymakers are mechanically 
incorporating information about the current state of the economy and anticipate future macroeconomic conditions 
in their forecasts and we need to correct for their forward-looking information set. 
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Our baseline measures of exogenous monetary shocks are based on the shadow rate measure 
of Wu and Xia (2016). Because monetary policy has taken many different dimensions over the 
last years and we ought to consider shocks to unconventional instruments and communication 
policies (forward guidance, for instance) in addition to shocks to the conventional instrument, 
we use this shadow rate measure that translates these various dimensions in a single variable 
expressed in interest rate space to measure the overall stance of monetary policy (labelled MP). 
In a second step, we also estimate shocks specific to the policy rate (labelled PR) and to an 
indicator of the central bank balance sheet size (labelled Unconv) to further analyse the 
response of bubble indicators to conventional and unconventional policies in normal and 
exceptional times respectively. For the former, we consider the federal funds target rate. For 
the latter, we consider the monthly change in the size of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet. 
 
The baseline shock to the overall monetary stance and its two alternatives are estimated with 
the following equations from which we extract the residuals: 
∆𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 Ω𝑡 + 𝛽3 Ψ𝑡 + 𝛽4 X𝑡−1 + 𝛽5 Z𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡
′         (6) 
𝜖𝑡
′ =  𝛽6 + 𝛽7𝜖𝑡−1
′ + 𝜖𝑟𝑟,𝑡             (7) 
 
where it is the monetary policy instrument. We assume that the monetary shock must be 
orthogonal to the contemporaneous policymakers’ information set Ωt, to the private agents’ 
one Ψt, to lagged financial market variables embedded in Xt-1, and to a vector Zt of 
contemporaneous macroeconomic variables. This shock to the overall monetary policy stance, 
𝜖𝑟𝑟,𝑡  , is labelled MP-Shocks-RR (𝜖𝑟𝑟,𝑡
𝑖  for the shock to the policy rate, labelled PR, and 𝜖𝑟𝑟,𝑡
𝑈𝑛𝑐  for 
the shock to unconventional policies, labelled Unconv). A consequence of the timing of the 
right-hand-side vectors in equation (6) is that monetary shocks affect contemporaneously 
financial market variables, but do not affect contemporaneously central bank’s and private 
agents’ information sets or macroeconomic variables. We believe that the opposite 
assumptions that monetary shocks are only based on past data or that they do not influence 
financial markets in real-time are fragile.18 Because of potential information frictions, 𝜖𝑡
′ is 
made orthogonal to 𝜖𝑡−1
′  (equation 7) so that estimated residuals do not contain information 
from past structural shocks. 
 
The policymakers’ information set Ωt comprises the level and change in FOMC inflation and 
output projections for current and next calendar years, Ψt includes the level and change in US 
SPF inflation forecasts for 1, 2 and 5 years ahead (resp. next quarter and next year), Xt contains 
the VIX and the oil price growth rate, and Zt comprises current and lagged values of the 
inflation rate, industrial production and the monthly-interpolated real GDP growth rate. We 
use central bank macroeconomic forecasts (FOMC projections) and private ones (the US 
Survey of Professional Forecasters, SPF).19 
 
 
                                                     
18 One could argue that there may also be information frictions in financial markets and that financial variables in 
t-1 do not incorporate information news from t-2, t-3, etc. We control for this by estimating equation (6) with two 
additional lags. The correlation between this alternative series and the baseline is 0.99. These estimates are available 
from the authors upon request. 
19 The FOMC publishes forecasts for inflation and real GDP growth twice a year in the Monetary Policy Report to 
the Congress since 1979. Since October 2007, their publication is quarterly. We consider forecasts of the Personal 
Consumption Expenditures (PCE) measure of inflation and real GDP. We consider the midpoint of the “full range” 
of all individual FOMC members’ forecasts. FOMC projections have been constant-interpolated to monthly 
frequency. We assess the robustness of our identification with Greenbook projections. The alternative series of 
monetary shocks using Greenbook projections instead of FOMC projections has a 0.91 correlation with the baseline 
series. The SPF is collected from around 40 panellists and published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. 
SPF CPI forecasts are provided as year-over-year percent changes. We consider the median of individual responses. 
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3.2. Alternative measures of monetary shocks 
 
A first alternative is to follow Kuttner (2001)’s high frequency methodology to identify 
monetary shocks using changes in the price of futures contracts. Kuttner (2001) identifies 
monetary surprises by accounting for the forward-looking nature of financial data. For a 
monetary policy event on day d of the month m, the monetary shock can be derived from the 
variation in the rate implied by current-month futures contracts on that day. The price of the 
future being computed as the average monthly rate, the change in the futures rate must be 
augmented by a factor related to the number of days in the month affected by the change: 
 𝜖𝑘𝑢𝑡𝑡,𝑡 =
𝐷
𝐷−𝑑
(𝑓𝑚,𝑑
0 − 𝑓𝑚,𝑑−1
0 )              (8) 
 
𝜖𝑘𝑢𝑡𝑡,𝑡 is the unexpected interest rate variation which constitutes a monetary shock, 𝑓𝑚,𝑑
0  is the 
current-month futures rate and D is the number of days in the month and d the day of the 
decision. One issue with the Kuttner measure is that it focuses on futures contracts about 
interest rate only. However, monetary policy has taken many different dimensions over the 
last years and Wu and Xia (2016) have proposed shadow rate measures that capture the 
different dimensions of monetary policy in a single variable expressed in interest rate space. 
However, their measure has a monthly frequency. Krippner (2013, 2014) has estimated 
shadow short rate (SSR) series at the daily frequency and it therefore enables to apply the 
Kuttner’s high frequency event-study identification of monetary surprises to the daily 
variation in SSRt on the policy announcement day:  
ϵkripp,t = SSRt - SSRt-1        (9) 
 
Because shadow rate measures are not calendar-based instruments like fed funds futures, 
there is no need for an adjustment for the remaining number of days. These shocks (labelled 
MP-Shocks-HF) rely on the financial market participants’ interpretation of the overall 
monetary news disclosed that day, and include private reactions to central bank conventional 
or unconventional decisions, and to central bank communication released at the same time. 
 
A second alternative for identifying monetary surprises is to estimate a forward looking Taylor 
rule equation augmented with oil prices and a financial stress index (included in the vector 
Yt). This equation is estimated over the full sample. The monetary policy shock (labelled MP-
Shocks-TR) is then the residuals of the following equation: 
𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽8 + 𝛽9 𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝜋𝑡+6 + 𝛽11𝑜𝑔𝑡+6  + 𝛽12𝑌𝑡+6 + 𝜖𝑡𝑟,𝑡          (10) 
 
Figure 2 plots the shocks to the overall monetary policy stance using the baseline approach 
following Romer and Romer (2004) and the two alternative shock series described in this 
subsection. Table C in the Appendix provides descriptive statistics for these different 
monetary shocks and their correlation. 
 
When investigating the effect of monetary policy, estimated monetary shocks are expected to 
fulfil certain conditions. First, we assess the normality and autocorrelation of the estimated 
shock series. Table C in the Appendix provides the outcomes of these standard tests. These 
results call for putting less emphasis on Taylor rule type shocks as these shocks exhibit auto-
correlation. Second, for our estimated series of monetary shocks to be relevant, they need to 
be unpredictable from movements in data. We assess the predictability of the estimated shock 
series with Granger-causality type tests using 9 macroeconomic and financial variables. Table 
C in the Appendix shows the adjusted R² and F-stats of an OLS estimation that aims to test the 
null hypothesis that estimated series of exogenous shocks are not predictable. It shows that 
the Romer-Romer-type shock series are relevant to be used in our second-stage estimations. 
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4. The effect of monetary policy on asset price bubbles 
 
As emphasized previously, there is no consensus in the theoretical literature about the effect 
of monetary policy on asset price bubbles. In the “leaning against the wind” approach, the link 
between monetary policy and bubbles is negative so that a restrictive monetary policy shock 
would reduce the size of bubbles. However, Galí (2014) shows that a restrictive monetary 
policy would increase the size of bubbles. The empirical strategy aims to disentangle between 
these two possible responses of asset price bubbles to monetary shocks. To that end, we assess 
the impact of monetary shocks on asset price bubbles with the local projection method 
proposed by Jordà (2005). This method is flexible and may easily account for asymmetries in 
the transmission of monetary policy, and allow us to disentangle the impact of restrictive and 
expansionary monetary shocks.20 We also assess the impact of monetary shocks depending on 
whether the instrument is the policy rate or balance sheet measures. 
 
4.1. Empirical strategy 
 
Assessing the impact of shocks on a given economic variable may be realized either through 
VAR models or with Jordà’s Local Projection method. Whereas the first method enables to 
take into account the intertwined dynamics of a set of variables, it may be imposing excessive 
restrictions on the endogenous dynamics and may be prone to bias if the model is misspecified. 
The second method offers more flexibility in the estimation. In linear stationary settings, the 
out-of-sample forecasting performance of VARs and local projections is quite similar (see 
Marcellino et al., 2006, and Kilian and Kim, 2011). However, because a linear low-order 
autoregressive representation of the data generating process of macroeconomic time series 
may be deceptive, the robustness of local projections to model misspecification and non-
linearity makes them an appealing procedure to recover dynamic responses to exogenous 
shocks. Considering that these exogenous structural shocks are identified ex ante, Jordà (2005) 
suggests estimating a set of h regressions representing the impulse response of the dependent 
variable at the horizon h to a given shock at time t: 
𝑦𝑡+ℎ = 𝛼ℎ + 𝛽ℎ𝜖𝑡 + ∑ 𝜙ℎ,𝑖. 𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜂𝑡+ℎ  
2
𝑖=1        (11) 
 
where 𝑦𝑡+ℎ is the dependent variable – the bubble indicator - at the horizon h, 𝜖𝑡 represents 
the monetary shock, either to the overall policy stance or to conventional and unconventional 
measures specifically, and yt-i are lags of the dependent variable (that we set to 2 based on the 
non-significance of additional lags). We set h to 24 periods to measure the effect of monetary 
shocks on bubble indicators over 2 years. Finally, because the estimated monetary shocks are 
generated regressors that might cause biased standard errors, we compute heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation robust Newey-West standard errors assuming that the autocorrelation 
dies out after three lags.21 This correction also enables to control for potential 
heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation of the residuals. 
 
Furthermore, we investigate if expansionary and restrictive monetary shocks have different 
effects and thus if a linear framework may bias the outcome. Such an asymmetric response is 
                                                     
20 Cover (1992) illustrates the differentiated impact of expansionary and restrictive monetary policy shocks on 
output. His results suggest that expansionary shocks would have limited effects while restrictive shocks would be 
more powerful. These results have been challenged by Wise (1999) and remain discussed (see Angrist et al., 2017, 
or Tenreyro and Thwaites, 2016). 
21 We have also computed standard errors robust to misspecification using the Huber-White-sandwich estimator 
and they provide smaller confidence intervals around the point estimate. This generated regressor issue is common 
to all empirical studies estimating exogenous shocks in a first step as in Romer and Romer (2004), but is more acute 
when the generated regressors are not normally distributed. 
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highlighted by the literature analysing the impact of monetary policy on output, suggesting 
that restrictive monetary shocks would be more powerful than expansionary shocks. Equation 
(11) may be modified to account for non-linearities: 
𝑦𝑡+ℎ = 𝛼ℎ + 𝛽𝐼,ℎ(𝜖𝑡. Λ𝑡) + 𝛽𝜖,ℎ𝜖𝑡 +  𝛽Λ,ℎΛ𝑡 + ∑ 𝜙ℎ,𝑖. 𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜂𝑡+ℎ  
2
𝑖=1               (12) 
 
where Λt is a dummy variable for expansionary monetary policy shocks. This specification 
aims to single out the potential asymmetric effects of restrictive (𝛽𝜖,ℎ) and expansionary (𝛽𝜖,ℎ +
 𝛽𝐼,ℎ) monetary shocks on bubble indicators.  
 
4.2. Linear and non-linear evidence 
 
The linear responses over 24 months of stock and housing bubbles to the baseline monetary 
shocks (i.e. MP-Shocks-RR) are plotted in the upper-panel of Figure 3. Point estimates are 
shown with 1 and 2 standard-errors confidence intervals. We find that the stock market bubble 
reacts positively to the restrictive monetary shock starting from the 14th month whereas there 
is no evidence of monetary shocks affecting the housing price bubble indicator. 
 
The lower panel of figure 3 plots the non-linear effects of monetary policy. For comparison, 
the linear response of bubble indicators is also represented together with the non-linear 
responses. The response of the stock bubble indicator to a restrictive shock is not significant 
whereas the response to an expansionary shock is positive. This effect is significantly different 
from zero from the 14th to the 20th month, and significantly different from the linear response 
after the 8th month. Monetary shocks account for around 3% of the variance of the stock bubble 
component.22 The linear effect shown in the upper panel of Figure 3 therefore seems to stem 
from the assumption that the impacts of restrictive and expansionary shocks are symmetric. 
The asymmetric result however suggests that restrictive monetary policy has no effect on stock 
bubbles, but expansionary monetary policy would inflate them. The non-linear responses of 
the housing bubble indicator to restrictive and expansionary shocks are not significant. 
 
The linear and non-linear responses show that the effects of monetary shocks on asset price 
bubbles are not symmetric. It calls for differentiating the responses to restrictive and 
expansionary shocks. Thus, when the monetary policy stance is measured by a shadow rate 
encompassing standard and unconventional monetary policy measures, restrictive monetary 
policy would neither be able to deflate stock price bubbles as proposed by the “leaning against 
the wind” literature nor inflate them as predicted by rational bubble models. However, 
expansionary monetary policy may contribute to increase stock market bubbles as illustrated 
by the responses of the bubble indicator.  
 
4.3. Does the instrument matter? 
 
The previous results are based on a proxy (the shadow rate) measuring the overall monetary 
policy stance. However, the effect of standard monetary policy may differ from the effect of 
unconventional monetary measures. In the policy debate, concerns have emerged about 
potential adverse effects of unconventional measures and notably quantitative easing policies, 
which may have fuelled asset price bubbles. This debate can be seen as a variation of the debate 
on the risks associated to periods of prolonged expansionary policy when policy rates remain 
“too low for too long”. In reaction to this, it has been advocated that a “leaning against the 
wind” policy would help mitigating asset price bubbles. These issues can be dealt with by 
                                                     
22 We compute the variance decomposition using partial R² that indicates the fraction of the improvement in R² that 
is contributed by the excluded covariate. 
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disentangling the effects of shocks to the policy rate before July 2008 and shocks to 
unconventional policies since July 2008. To this end, we estimate equation (12) which accounts 
for the asymmetric effects of monetary policy, either with the policy rate or with a measure for 
unconventional monetary policy instead of the shadow rate. 
 
We investigate the impact of interest rate policies by raising two questions. First, do 
expansionary interest rate shocks fuel stock bubbles? Second, are exogenous interest rate 
increases effective in deflating stock price bubbles as claimed by proponents of the “leaning 
against the wind”? To that end, we adjust equation (12) in two respects: first, we replace the 
shock to the overall stance of monetary policy, 𝜖𝑡, by the exogenous shock to the conventional 
policy rate, 𝜖𝑡
𝑖, and second, we estimate equation (13) on a subsample ending in June 2008.23 
𝑦𝑡+ℎ = 𝛼ℎ + 𝛽𝐼,ℎ(𝜖𝑡
𝑖 . Λ𝑡) + 𝛽𝜖ℎ𝜖𝑡
𝑖 + 𝛽Λ,ℎΛ𝑡 + ∑ 𝜙ℎ,𝑖. 𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜂𝑡+ℎ 
2
𝑖=1               (13) 
 
The upper left-hand side of Figure 4 plots the responses of the stock market bubble to 
restrictive shocks to the policy rate. Results suggest that restrictive interest rate shocks would 
still have no effect on the stock market bubble confirming the previous results when we 
consider the shadow rate as the instrument of monetary policy. The case for the “leaning 
against the wind” approach seems fragile as we find no evidence that restrictive monetary 
policy would deflate bubbles. It may also be noticed that adopting a more restrictive monetary 
policy stance to deflate bubbles would not trigger the adverse effects on stock market bubble 
emphasized by the rational bubble models à la Galí (2014).  
 
The lower left-hand side of Figure 4 plots the responses of the stock market bubble to 
expansionary interest rate shocks. It provides an assessment of the risks associated with 
expansionary monetary policy in normal times when central banks use the policy rate as the 
main policy instrument. The stock market bubble responds positively to an expansionary 
interest rate shock. There seems to be risks associated with low interest rates but they would 
be circumvented to the stock market.  
 
Finally, we analyse the effect of unconventional monetary shocks identified after July 2008. 
We adjust the estimation of equation (12) in two respects: first, we replace the exogenous shock 
to the overall stance of monetary policy, 𝜖𝑡, by the exogenous shock to unconventional policies, 
𝜖𝑡
𝑈𝑛𝑐, and second, we estimate equation (14) on a subsample starting in July 2008. 
𝑦𝑡+ℎ = 𝛼ℎ + 𝛽𝐼,ℎ(𝜖𝑡
𝑈𝑛𝑐 . Λ𝑡) + 𝛽𝜖,ℎ𝜖𝑡
𝑈𝑛𝑐 + 𝛽Λ,ℎΛ𝑡 + ∑ 𝜙ℎ,𝑖. 𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜂𝑡+ℎ 
2
𝑖=1     (14) 
 
where Λ𝑡 is a dummy variable for expansionary monetary policy shocks. The identification of 
shocks is performed with the method described in section 3 for the post-2008 subsample and 
considering unconventional policies only. The right-hand side of Figure 4 illustrates the effect 
of restrictive and expansionary shocks to the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet. Restrictive 
monetary policy has no effect consistent with earlier evidence. The response of the stock 
market bubble to expansionary shocks indicates that unconventional measures do not feed 
bubbles. The response is even negative around 5 months and after 19 months indicating that 
the implementation of Federal Reserve’s QE would have reduced the bubble component of 
stock prices, as suggested by the rational bubble model à la Galí (2014).24 So the risk of a stock 
price bubble related to unconventional policies does not materialize in the data. The concerns 
                                                     
23 We estimate equation (13) for the stock bubble indicator only based on the absence of significant results for 
housing bubbles in the previous section. Estimates of equation (13) for the housing market are again not significant 
and available upon request from the authors. Further theoretical research may focus on making clearer why there 
is a different transmission of monetary policy to the bubble component of stock and housing markets. 
24 Although Gali (2014) considers the impact of conventional interest rate policies, the present finding suggests that 
his conclusion might apply to the effect of unconventional policies.  
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raised by Borio and Zabai (2016) about the side-effects of QE are not confirmed when focusing 
on the bubble component of stock prices. 
 
4.4. An application to the euro area 
 
We estimate the effects of monetary shocks on asset price bubbles in the EA using the same 
method for both the identification of bubble indicators and monetary shocks as for the US. 
Data are available from January 1999 to June 2016 for the EA. The stock price index is the 
Eurostoxx (listing the largest 295 firms). House prices data stem from a quarterly index for 
residential property prices calculated by the European Central Bank (ECB). Considering the 
cash-flow model, we use quarterly dividends paid by financial and non-financial corporations 
and quarterly rents received by households are available from Eurostat for the five biggest EA 
countries. The long-term interest rate – from benchmark government bonds – is used as the 
discount factor. The CISS is used to account for a time-varying risk-premium. We also identify 
the fundamental component with a model estimated on a large set of information, including 
macroeconomic and financial indicators such as: real disposable income, inflation, real GDP, 
industrial production, oil prices, European Commission confidence indicators for household 
and industry, a financial stress indicator (CISS), 3-month interbank interest rate, M3 and credit 
aggregates (credit counterparties of monetary aggregate). For the identification of monetary 
shocks, we use the ECB/Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections and the ECB’s SPF. 
 
Figure 5 plots the linear and non-linear bubble responses in the EA. The linear responses of 
both stock and housing bubble indicators are presented in the upper-panel and are not 
significant. The lower panel illustrates the decomposition between restrictive and 
expansionary shocks. Restrictive shocks do not influence asset price bubbles whereas 
expansionary shocks affect positively stock and housing price bubbles. Evidence using EA 
data confirms that the effects of monetary shocks on asset price bubbles are asymmetric. They 
also show that restrictive monetary policies would not be able to deflate asset price bubbles. 
Finally, these results confirm that expansionary shocks may fuel bubbles. 
 
4.5. Sensitivity analysis 
 
We assess the sensitivity of our baseline results to alternative assumptions at each step of the 
empirical methodology. First, we test whether the results are driven by the model-averaging 
feature of the PCA, which may aggregate individual bubble components with different 
reactions to monetary shocks. We test this hypothesis by estimating the effect of monetary 
shocks on each individual bubble component – the “structural”, “econometric” and 
“statistical” approaches. More precisely, we estimate equations (11) and (12) separately for 
𝜖𝑡
𝑂𝐿𝑆, the rolling-sum of 𝜈𝑡
𝑂𝐿𝑆 and the dummy variable. Second, we test whether alternative 
measures of the PCA bubble indicator, as described in section 2.4, react differently to monetary 
shocks. Third, we test whether our results are sensitive to the identification of monetary shocks 
as described in section 3.2. Fourth, we examine whether alternative specifications of the Local 
Projection model alter the results. We modify equations (11) and (12) in four ways: without 
any controls, with the contemporaneous bubble indicator of the other asset, with forward 
values (at the same horizon h) of the bubble indicator of the other asset, and with the level of 
the policy variable and lags of the monetary shock (as proposed by Ramey, 2016). 
 
Robustness tests for the linear and the non-linear specification are available in Figures A and 
B in the appendix. These figures plot the responses of all alternatives described above together 
with the baseline response with its corresponding confidence interval for each market. We find 
that the alternative responses do not differ significantly from the baseline response. The main 
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results of this paper are strongly confirmed. First, the effects of monetary policy are 
asymmetric. Second, restrictive monetary policy is not able to deflate asset price bubbles 
whereas expansionary policies do fuel stock market bubbles. These two results are robust to 
individual bubble measures, alternative PCA bubble indicators, different procedures to 
estimate monetary shocks and several specifications of the local projection equation. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Because financial stability is now an objective for central bank policymakers, the issue of 
whether monetary policy may help achieving this goal is crucial and notably hinges on the 
effect of monetary policy instruments on asset prices. Yet, it must be reminded that the reaction 
of asset prices is also part of the transmission channel of monetary policy. Consequently, 
central banks need to know if asset price movements are desirable or when monetary policy 
has negative side-effects. This paper deals with this issue and assesses the impact of monetary 
policy shocks on asset price bubbles. To this end, we propose a novel approach to identify 
bubbles on stock and housing markets based on a range of bubble models usually used in the 
literature. As none of existing models have reached consensus, we develop a new bubble 
indicator based on a model-averaging approach.  
 
A key message of this paper is that the response of bubbles is not symmetric. The responses to 
restrictive and expansionary shocks in empirical analyses should be differentiated. This calls 
for more theoretical research on the transmission channels of monetary policy to bubbles to 
account for these asymmetries. The main result of the paper is that restrictive policies are not 
able to deflate asset price bubbles whereas expansionary policies inflate them. Besides, the 
effect of expansionary monetary policy also depends on the policy instrument. Our results 
suggest that the risk that quantitative easing would inflate asset price bubbles does not 
materialize in the data. However, interest rates cuts – standard expansionary monetary policy 
– would have significant and positive effects on stock price bubbles. 
 
From a policy perspective, central banks should be aware that there is a risk for lower policy 
rate to inflate stock price bubbles. However, due to the asymmetric response of bubble 
components, monetary policy would not be the right tool to try to deflate them. Financial 
instability may not be seen only through asset price bubbles, so that there may be a role for 
monetary policy through its effect on credit to dampen financial risks together with 
macroprudential policies. 
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Figure 1. Asset price bubbles 
 
Stock market 
 
 
Housing market 
 
 
Note: authors’ estimations described in section 2. The thin red line corresponds to the individual 
bubble series of model 1 (the structural one). and econometric models. The thin black line 
corresponds to the individual bubble series of model 2 (the data-rich one). The grey area corresponds 
to the dummy variable of model 3 (the statistical approach). The thick blue line plots the first 
principal component of the three preceding series. All continuous series are normalized. The right 
scale is expressed in standard deviation of the corresponding series. 
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Figure 2. Monetary shocks 
 
Overall monetary stance (shadow rate) 
 
 
Note: Romer and Romer (RR), high-frequency event study (HF) and Taylor rule-type monetary 
shocks are computed by estimating equations (9)-(10), (12) and (13) respectively as described in 
section 3. The unit on both the left and right scale is in percentage points.   
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Figure 3. Linear and non-linear bubble responses  
 
Linear responses to a restrictive (positive) shock to the overall monetary stance 
 
 
 
Non-linear responses 
 
 
Note: Linear and non-linear responses correspond to estimates of equations (11) and (12) respectively. Shaded 
area represents the 1 and 2 standard errors confidence interval of the response of the baseline shock (MP-
Shocks-RR). The y axis is expressed in terms of standard deviation of the bubble indicators. The monetary 
shock corresponds to a 1 standard deviation increase in the shock series.  
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Figure 4. Non-linear stock bubble responses to different policy instruments 
 
Shocks to the policy rate Shocks to the balance sheet size 
 
 
 
Note: Left-hand side and right-hand side responses correspond to estimates of equation (13) and (14). Shaded 
area represents the 1 and 2 standard errors confidence interval around the non-linear response. The y axis is 
expressed in terms of standard deviation of the bubble indicators. The monetary shock corresponds to a 1 
standard deviation increase in the shock series. 
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Figure 5. Linear and non-linear bubble responses in the euro area 
 
Linear responses to a restrictive (positive) shock to the overall monetary stance 
 
 
 
Non-linear responses 
 
 
 
Note: Linear and non-linear responses correspond to estimates of equations (11) and (12) respectively. Shaded 
area represents the 1 and 2 standard errors confidence interval of the response of the baseline shock (MP-
Shocks-RR). The y axis is expressed in terms of standard deviation of the bubble indicators. The monetary 
shock corresponds to a 1 standard deviation increase in the shock series. 
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Table 1. Range of individual bubble models & PCA estimation 
 
  
ID Approach
Estimation 
Method
Bubble 
identification
model 1 Cash-flow OLS Residuals
model 2 Data-rich OLS
Rolling 3y sum of 
residuals
model 3 Statistical
Christiano-Fitzgerald
 filter
1.5 standard deviation 
deviation from trend
ε
OLS
ν
OLS
0.00 0.63
0.00 0.85
ε
OLS
ν
OLS
0.00 0.50
0.00 0.00
model 1 model 2 model 3
model 1 1
model 2 0.33 1
model 3 0.54 0.20 1
model 1 model 2 model 3
model 1 1
model 2 0.47 1
model 3 0.15 0.41 1
Eigenvalue Proportion KMO stat
PCA_Bubble_Stock 1.74 0.58 0.57
PCA_Bubble_Housing 1.70 0.57 0.54
Variable model 1 model 2 model 3
PCA_Bubble_Stock 0.65 0.46 0.61
PCA_Bubble_Housing 0.55 0.66 0.51
Cumby-Huizinga test for autocorrelation
Portmanteau test for white noise
Portmanteau test for white noise
Housing market
p-values for autocorrelation and white noise tests
Stock market
Cumby-Huizinga test for autocorrelation
Note: The KMO stat is the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy.
Housing market
Correlation structure between individual bubble series
Stock market
Principal component/correlation (Rotation: unrotated - Obs = 365)
Correlation (PCA_Bubble_Stock,PCA_Bubble_Housing) = 0.13
PCA scoring coefficients (eigenvectors)
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APPENDIX 
NOT FOR PUBLICATION 
 
Table A. Data sources and Description 
 
 
Name Description Source Frequency
Stock sp500 S&P 500 Datastream Monthly
Housing housep Shiller Index Shiller Monthly
Dividends divid_rsa Paid dividends by corporations BEA Quarterly
Rents rent Rents received by households BEA Quarterly
Discount factor txlg 10 year treasury bond interest rates Datastream Monthly
Risk premium vix Volatility Index CBOE Monthly
Income rdb Real disposable income BEA Quarterly
Real GDP gdp Real GDP BEA Quarterly
IndPro ipi Industrial production BEA Monthly
Oil prices oil Oil prices Datastream Monthly
Inflation inf Inflation BEA Monthly
Confidence
 indicators
csind & 
cscons
Confidence indicators for consumers 
and firms
Conference Board 
& ISM
Monthly
Financial stress kcfsi Kansas City Financial indicator FRED Monthly
Monetary Aggregate m2 M2 Datastream Monthly
Credit Aggregate credit Credits granted by commercial banks Datastream Monthly
Policy rate fedfunds Effective FFR Federal Res. Monthly
Target rate fedtarget FFR target Federal Res. Monthly
shadow rate wu&xia Shadow rate Wu-Xia (2015) Monthly
shadow rate krippner Shadow rate Krippner
 (2016) Daily
Unconventional 
measures
unconv Table H.4.1 Fed's total assets Federal Reserve Monthly
Note: All nominal variables are deflated by the CPI. 
Asset prices
Monetary policy
Data-rich information
Cash-flow model
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Table B. Descriptive statistics 
 
 
  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
sp500_r 368 6.36 0.47 5.36 7.11
housep_r 368 4.16 0.16 3.96 4.52
divid_rsa 368 4.30 0.44 3.43 4.96
txlg_r 368 2.59 1.70 -1.85 6.03
rent_r 368 3.40 0.82 1.62 4.59
rdb_r 368 7.25 0.20 6.88 7.58
ipi 368 -0.17 0.20 -0.56 0.06
gdp 368 8.29 0.23 7.86 8.63
inf 368 2.64 1.37 -1.96 6.38
m2_r 368 8.21 0.12 8.01 8.49
credit_r 368 7.98 0.33 7.46 8.54
csind 368 52.04 4.85 33.10 61.40
cscons 368 92.51 25.61 25.30 144.70
oil_r 368 2.96 0.54 1.82 4.11
vix 368 2.96 0.36 2.33 4.18
wu&xia 359 3.43 3.23 -2.99 9.85
krippner 368 3.05 3.63 -5.37 9.85
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Table C. Properties of estimated monetary shocks 
 
  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
mpshock_rr 366 0.00 0.18 -0.74 0.80
mpshock_tr 361 0.00 0.21 -0.93 0.95
mpshock_hf 200 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01
prshock_rr 267 0.00 0.14 -0.65 0.47
uncshock_rr 97 0.00 0.04 -0.14 0.16
mpshock_rr mpshock_tr mpshock_hf prshock_rr uncshock_rr
mpshock_rr 1
mpshock_tr 0.84 1
mpshock_hf 0.25 0.33 1
prshock_rr 0.81 0.68 0.21 1
uncshock_rr -0.15 -0.12 -0.03 . 1
Variable Obs W' V' z Prob>z
mpshock_rr 366 0.94 15.78 5.93 0.00
mpshock_tr 361 0.95 13.47 5.59 0.00
mpshock_hf 200 0.79 34.51 7.32 0.00
prshock_rr 267 0.97 5.73 3.68 0.00
uncshock_rr 97 0.87 11.56 4.83 0.00
AR(1) coef. F-stat p-value Adjusted R²
mpshock_rr 0.00 mpshock_rr 0.69 0.73 -0.01
mpshock_tr 0.45*** mpshock_tr 3.81 0.00 0.07
mpshock_hf 0.04 mpshock_hf 2.24 0.02 0.06
prshock_rr 0.01 prshock_rr 2.74 0.00 0.06
uncshock_rr -0.03 uncshock_rr 0.49 0.89 -0.06
Note: The vector of variables for predictability tests includes lagged values of inflation, ipi, gdp, shadow, ffr, oil,
m2, vix, and bonds.
Descriptive statistics
Correlation
Shapiro-Francia normality test
Autocorrelation test Predictability of exogenous shock series
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Figure A. Robustness tests for the linear specification 
 
Bubble models decomposition 
 
Alternative PCA 
 
Alternative monetary shocks 
 
LP specification 
 
 
Note: Linear responses correspond to estimates of equation (11). Shaded area represents the 2 standard 
errors confidence interval of the response of the baseline shock (MP-Shocks-RR). The y axis is expressed 
in terms of standard deviation of the bubble indicators. The monetary shock corresponds to a 1 standard 
deviation increase in the shock series.  
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Figure B. Robustness tests to the non-linear specification 
 
Bubble models decomposition 
 
Alternative PCA 
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Monetary shocks 
 
LP specification 
 
Note: Linear and non-linear responses correspond to estimates of equations (11) and (12) respectively. 
Shaded area represents the 2 standard errors confidence interval of the response of the baseline shock (MP-
Shocks-RR). The y axis is expressed in terms of standard deviation of the bubble indicators. The monetary 
shock corresponds to a 1 standard deviation increase in the shock series.  
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